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EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY-ONE SIMPLE TEST
HARRY P. THOMSON, JR.*
THOMAS J. LEirM**
I. THE PROBATIVE FORCE TEST
Evidence is admissible when it is of sufficient force that it logically
tends to prove or disprove a fact or issue necessary to a decision of the
particular case, unless such evidence is excluded by a rule of law or policy
not primarily concerned with the probative force of evidence. This probative
force test is the basic requirement for the admissibility of evidence. It is
not a new test or a principle. It was referred to by Thayer as early as 1898.1
It has been discussed by Wigmore,2 McCormick,3 Fisch,4 Morgan, 5 and
other authorities.
This basic test has been buried and forgotten under volumes of
discourse on logical relevancy, legal relevancy, conditional relevancy, ma-
teriality, hearsay and its exceptions, judicial notice and the whole gamut of
historical formalized rules of evidence. Some progress is being made through
efforts of modem writers to correlate and explain the formalized rules
of evidence developed in the last three centuries. A clear expression and
resurrection of the basic reason for the admissibility of evidence is long
overdue.
II. RECOGNITION OF EXCLUSIONARY RULES AND POLICIES
NOT BASED ON PROBATIVE FORCE
An effort to resolve the confusion was made by one of the authors
in 1963 in a statement of the probative force test and an analysis of its
use by the appellate courts of Missouri.6 As stated there the probative
*Partner, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, Missouri, LL.B. 1939,
University of Missouri.
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1. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW,
ch. VI (1898).
2. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 9-12 (3d ed. 1940).
3. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE pp. 320-21 (1954).
4. FISCH, NEw YORK EVIDENCE § 3 (1959).
5. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE ch. 4 (1963).
6. Thomson, Evidence, 28 Mo. L. REV. 539 (1963).
(17)
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force test required only that evidence to be admissible must be of suffi-
cient force that, if believed, it logically tends to prove or lisprove a fact
or issue necessary to a decision of the case before the court.7 However, to
express the test of admissibility completely, the authors have concluded
that a provision must be made for rules of law or policies which exclude
otherwise admissible evidence on grounds not primarily concerned with
its probative force. Therefore, we have added to the test, as previously
stated the clause, "unless such evidence is excluded by a rule of law or
policy not primarily concerned with the probative force of evidence."
As originally formulated, the probative force test provided that
any evidence meeting the test was admissible. Obviously, this is not so.
For example, there is a constitutional guarantee against self-incrimina-
tion. The testimony of a witness might well meet the probative force
test but still be excluded under the Fifth Amendment. Certain communica-
tions are absolutely privileged by statute, such as those between client and
attorney. The Dead Man Statute and other statutes exclude evidence.
Sometimes evidence is excluded not by constitutional guarantees or
statute, but as a matter of well-recognized and established policy.
One such policy area involves collateral issues. Otherwise admissible
evidence may open up collateral issues to an extent that confusion would
be created in deciding the main issue being tried. In such cases the court
must exercise discretion primarily on the basis of whether the admission of
the evidence is directly pertinent to the issue to be decided. In exercising
that discretion the court is not concerned principally with whether the
evidence meets the probative force test; it may well do so and yet be
subject to exclusion because it hinders making a rational decision on the
main issue.
Repetitious or cumulative evidence is another such area. Once ev-
idence reaches the point where it is repetitious or merely cumulative, it
should be excluded for the very practical reason of the limitation of time
in the conduct of human affairs. It could be argued that purely repetitious
or cumulative evidence does not meet the probative force test because
it does not have sufficient additional probative force alone, since other
evidence on the same fact or issue already has been introduced. This is
not a true application of the probative force test and would do violence
to its meaning. The cumulative or repetitious evidence might have as
much probative force as the first evidence introduced on the same subject.
7. Ibid. See also Thomson & Jensen, Evidence, 30 Mo, L. REv. 1 (1965).
[Vol. 31
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The real reason for exclusion is a practical consideration in the administra-
tion of justice, and it should be so recognized.
Thus the areas of exclusion of evidence are defined by rules of law,
constitutional or statutory, and by generally recognized specific policies.
These rules and policies of exclusion are not primarily concerned with the
probative force of evidence. They are not complex. They are subject to
practical application. Recognition is given to such exclusionary rules and
policies by the last clause of the probative force test as now stated.
III. THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS OF FORMALIZED HISTORICAL RULES
GIVE No PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ADMIsSIBILITY
The modem dialogue concerning logical relevancy, legal relevancy,
and conditional relevancy does not solve the question of admissibility.
Evidence is sometimes said to be logically relevant if it tends to prove
or disprove a proposition properly provable in the case. This is circuitous
argument: if a proposition is properly provable in the case, then it is
logically relevant.
Legal relevancy is said to be that evidence which is logically relevant
and which is admissible, that is, not inadmissible. There is a singular lack
of a practical guideline in such discussion. Nor is it helpful to state that
legal relevancy is more limited than logical relevancy, and that even evi-
dence which may be legally relevant is sometimes only conditionally
relevant.
The mere statement of the different definitions and categories of
relevancy illustrates the difficulty in avoiding confusion when emphasiz-
ing relevancy as a test for admissibility. The likelihood of confusion
increases because of disagreement among authorities as to whether log-
ical relevancy or legal relevancy should control admissibility. Such scholarly
discussion, while interesting, is of little assistance to the trial judge and
lawyer. The often complex and confusing arguments concerning relevancy
of whatever category are avoided by the simple probative force test of
admissibility.
IV. FORMALIZED HISTORICAL RULES ARE APPLICATIONS OF
THE PROBATIVE FORCE TEST IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS
Formalized historical rules of admissibility were developed only as
an indication of the reliability of evidence in specific situations. They
3
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are merely an application of the probative force test in such situations.
Unless this principle is recognized, confusion results. It is for this reason
that appellate decisions often appear to be in conflict with the application
of evidentiary rules. Such conflict disappears when the probative force
test is applied.
The hearsay rule and its exceptions, for example, are nothing more
than applications of the probative force test. Hearsay was originally
excluded because it was considered unreliable. It did not have sufficient
probative force to be admissible. But certain situations give a guaranty of
reliability so that hearsay has sufficient probative force. Thus developed
the hearsay rule exceptions of res gestae, admissions against interest,
declarations against interest, dying declarations and similar categories.
The business record rule does nothing but state that recorded items which
might be hearsay are kept under circumstances that sufficiently guarantee
their probative force; therefore they are admissible.
A similar review of each formalized historical rule of evidence reveals
that it is founded upon and is an application of the probative force
test. The difficulty is that what started out to be a means of expressing
the probative force test became an end in and of itself. The crutch of
the formalized historical rules of admissibility became so established
that little inquiry was made as to the basic reason for their existence.
It must be recognized that the formalized historical rules of admissibility
are mere expressions of the probative force test and are subject to the
fundamental application of that test. Otherwise, more rules and exceptions
to rules will proliferate. Confusion will continue to control. It is time
that discussion as to what constitutes prospectant evidence, concomitant
evidence and retrospectant evidence be relegated to history where it
belongs.8
V. THE PROBATIVE FORCE TEST DoEs WORK
The best argument for the use of the simple probative force test is
that it works. It establishes a rational basis for the admissibility of
evidence upon which a rational determination of the facts and issues can
be made by those charged with that responsibility. The basic purpose
of evidence is not lost. The practicality of the probative force test can
be illustrated by an analysis of the recent decisions of the appellate courts
of any state or federal jurisdiction. Whether expressed or not, the pro-
8. Supra note 2, § 43.
[Vol. 31
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bative force test is being applied as the controlling factor governing ad-
missibility of evidence. The appellate courts are referring to "probative
force" with greater frequency. Some recent decisions of the Missouri
appellate courts are examples of this trend.
A. Evidence Lacking Probative Force Excluded
In Matta v. Welclher9 the court held that defendant's offer of proof
that plaintiff's automobile traveled 350 to 375 miles in a short period of
time prior to the accident was properly refused. Defendant's counsel rec-
ognized there was little hope of securing admission of this evidence on
the theory that it showed excessive speed of plaintiff's automobile at the
very time of the two-car collision. Therefore, defendant's counsel argued
that this evidence showed that plaintiff was contributorily negligent
because he either acquiesced in or failed to protest against the consistent,
negligent and imprudent operation of the automobile before the collision.
The court held that the exclusion of such evidence was proper for
four reasons. First, evidence of the conduct of different drivers at distant
points during the trip was logically irrelevant. Second, the admission of
such evidence would have been prejudicial to plaintiff because contributory
negligence cannot be proved by showing similar prior acts of negligence.
Third, the probative value of the evidence was slight. Fourth, such ev-
idence would involve consideration of many collateral matters.
It was unnecessary for the court to do anything more than apply the
probative force test. The opinion makes it clear that this was the basic
test relied upon:
"Even disregarding the vagueness and generality of defendants'
offer of proof, and assuming that it might have been logically
relevant upon the pleaded issue of imputed contributory negligence,
had it been more fully developed, still the fact that evidence is
logically relevant in some degree does not imperatively require its
admission where, as here, the probative value of the evidence
is slight and its admission involves consideration of many collat-
eral matters which are remote in time and conjectural in their
nature."10
Logical relevancy was not the controlling principle and need not
have been mentioned. The court discussed two general exclusionary areas,
9. 387 S.W.2d 265 (Spr. Mo. App. 1965).
10. Id. at 269.
19661
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undue prejudice and the injection of collateral matters. Any evidence
adverse to a party may be said to be prejudicial to some extent. The
question is whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial. The evidence in
Matta would not qualify for exclusion on this basis. Nor would the offered
evidence qualify for exclusion because of the policy against injection of
collateral matters if the evidence had actual probative force. The real
reason this was excluded was because what happened on the long trip
preceding the collision was so remote in time and place that it did not
have sufficient force logically tending to prove the issue of plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence at the time and place of the accident. This lack of
probative force prevented this evidence from qualifying as admissible.
Courts do not always clearly refer to the probative force test in ex-
cluding evidence. Sometimes the reasons cited by the court for exclusion
are not justified upon close analysis. Under these circumstances it becomes
obvious that the probative force test was used, whether referred to or not.
In Parlow v. Dan Hamm Drayage Co." the collapse of an "A" frame
and jib was involved. Plaintiff submitted his theory of recovery under
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Defendant introduced evidence through an
expert witness as to the specific manner in which the "A" frame collapsed.
This evidence tended to refute plaintiff's claim that the collapse was
caused by defendant's negligence. When defendant by the same expert
witness attempted to introduce opinions as to the exact cause of the
collapse and how the "A" frame could have been used safely, plaintiff's
objections were sustained. In holding this evidence properly excluded,
the court first referred to the principle that the question of qualification
of an expert witness rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. The
difficulty with this assigned reason is that in the second preceding par-
agraph of the opinion the court noted that the witness' qualifications as
an expert were not questioned. The court then stated that defendant
already had the benefit of the expert's testimony as to the manner of
the collapse as well as the benefit of an effective demonstration as to
the cause of the collapse. The court next pointed out that further ex-
pressions by the witness as to whether or not the method employed in
using the "A" frame was proper would have been of little practical
assistance to the jury, and concluded that the jury was as capable as the
expert witness in deciding that issue from the evidence already presented.
11. 391 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. 1965).
[Vol. 31
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The basis of exclusion could not have been the failure of the witness
to qualify as an expert, nor the fact that his opinions might have been
so cumulative as to be excluded on the basis of policy against prolonging
trials beyond practical limits. The rational conclusion is that the court
was following the probative force test in holding that the mere opinion
of the expert as to what actually happened had no probative force for
two reasons: (1) the facts were already in evidence, and (2) the expert
witness did not have knowledge superior to that of the jury. Since the
expert did not possess superior knowledge as to how the accident happened,
he was no more qualified to decide that issue than the twelve jurors. The
expert's opinions, as such, in the excluded areas had insufficient probative
force.
B. Expert Witnesses and the Probative Force Test
Characterization of types of evidence tends to conceal the basic re-
quirement for admissibility. It is often stated by courts that certain
evidence should be excluded on multiple grounds. In reality there are
only two grounds why evidence is not admissible: it either fails to qualify
under the primary language of the probative force test or its admission
is prohibited by the exclusionary portion of the test under a rule of
law or established policy not concerned with probative force.
The probative force test is the only basis upon which rulings with
respect to testimony of expert witnesses can be made compatible. In
Shelby County R-IV School Dist. v. Hermran,12 a condemnation proceed-
ing, different grounds were assigned for excluding testimony from three
persons as to the value of the land being acquired. A landowner's opinion
evidence of value of the property involved normally is admissible in a con-
demnation proceeding because of his superior knowledge of his own
property. Yet, in this case the landowner's testimony as to the value
of his land was excluded because it was based primarily upon the net
profit from a farming operation for a selected period. The court pointed
out that an opinion based upon a highly variable factor was without pro-
bative value.
Two other witnesses testified on behalf of the landowner and were
qualified as real estate brokers dealing in farm properties. Their testi-
mony as to the commercial value of a portion of the farm land being
12. 392 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965).
1966]
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acquired was excluded. The court gave as a reason that these witnesses,
while expert with respect to farm properties, were not qualified as experts
with respect to commercial properties. In this portion of the opinion the
court did not refer to the probative force test or use the words, "probative
value." Yet the test was the same. The two witnesses, expert in the value
of farm properties, did not have any superior knowledge with respect to
the value of commercial properties so as to give their opinions on that
subject any probative force. The court might well have said that the
testimony of the witnesses in the form of their opinions on this subject
simply had no probative value.
In Nortk Kansas City Memorial Hosp. v. Wiley,13 a hospital admin-
istrator testified as an expert witness for the purpose of allocating charges
for hospitalization and medication. This was held reversible error because
the hospital administrator, while an expert in his chosen field, was not a
medical expert qualified in the matters on which he testified. Again,
this is simply another application of the probative force test. The hospital
administrator had no superior knowledge which gave his opinion any
more probative force than the opinion of any other layman. It is entirely
correct to say that he was not an expert witness in medical matters,
but the true ground for exclusion of evidence is more clearly expressed
in the terms of the probative force test.
In Beitram v. WVnning,14 a medical doctor testified he could not say
with reasonable medical certainty that the accident in question was the
competent producing cause of plaintiff's hernia. Subsequently, the doctor
testified there was a ninety per cent chance that it was caused by the
accident and a ten per cent chance that it was not. Clearly, the doctor
was an expert witness qualified in his field and competent to express an
opinion on the matter of causation. Yet, the court held that it was error
to admit the testimony of the doctor on causation because it allowed
the jury to award damages based upon speculation and conjecture. The
court remarked that a trial is not a game of chance. Expressing the pos-
sibility of causation in percentages is nothing more than speculation. The
doctor's testimony did not meet the probative force test, but the court
did not express it that way.
Bertram can be compared with Kinealy v. Soutlkwestern Bell Tele-
13. 385 S.W.2d 218 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964).
14. 385 S.W.2d 803 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
[Vol. 31
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/9
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY
phone Co.,15 where the expert was a geologist who testified in detail
concerning the possible causes of landslides. The geologist expressed the
opinion that it was extremely likely that defendant's activities in ex-
cavating a ditch caused the landslide which damaged plaintiff's property.
Then it was established that without specific soil tests the geologist could
not state with reasonable certainty that the excavation of the ditch was
the cause of the landslide. In fact, the probative force test was applied
and again it was held that the expert's testimony did not establish causa-
tion.
Kinealy and Bertram must be distinguished from Hay v. Ham,16 where
the testimony of a physician was ruled admissible to prove the physical
condition of plaintiff immediately before trial. There the causal connection
was established by other facts and circumstances in the case. Testimony
of plaintiff and other laymen was used and considered of sufficient probative
force to be admissible on the issue of causation. The opinions of the
expert were limited only to the existence of a condition. With respect to
that limited issue the expert had the facts to apply his superior knowledge;
his estimony had probative force on that limited issue. This concept is
supported by the dicta in Bertram pointing out that there was lack of
independent evidence of probative force to connect the condition which
the expert found with the accident.17 Reconciling or explaining evidentiary
rulings concerning expert witnesses by use of formalized historical rules
is a real challenge. It is much simpler to understand or predict evidentiary
rulings in the expert witness field if the probative force test is used.
C. B.siness Records and the Probative Force Test
In various jurisdictions, either by statute or case decisions, qualifica-
tions have been established for the admissibility of business records.
Unfortunately, these artificial qualifications often overlook the basic
purposes of evidence and consequently the probative force test. Even if
business records fail to qualify under a business records statute, they
still should be admitted into evidence if they meet the probative force
test.
In Mutual Fin. Co. v. Auto Supermarkets, Inc., 8 a former employee
15. 368 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1963).
16. 364 S.W.2d 118 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
17. Supra note 14.
18. 383 S.W.2d 296 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
1966]
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of plaintiff identified a ledger card which was introduced as a business
record. The court held that such admission was proper because the former
employee testified that he had been an officer of the company, had super-
vised the records system, had been involved personally in the business
transaction in question when it occurred and that the record was main-
tained in the usual course of business. The court expressed the additional
opinion that the facts to which he testified were sufficient to justify the
admission of the exhibit. However, it would appear that while the former
employee of plaintiff testified to many of the requirements of the Uni-
form Business Records as Evidence Law,1' it is certainly not clear that he
testified to all of such requirements. The record was not in his custody
or control at the time of trial. He had not personally seen the mortgage
and its execution to which the ledger card referred. Regardless of whether
there may have been some deficiencies in qualifying the ledger card ex-
hibit as a business record under all the strict requirements, it was recognized,
again without using the words, that it qualified under the probative force
test. That was sufficient.
D. Application of tte Probative Force Test Does Not Depend Upon
a Particular Characterizdtion of Evidence
The probative force test is not concerned with weighing one type of
evidence against another or weighing evidence within the same type;
that is the function of the trier of fact. The probative force test is concerned
only with admissibility in the first instance.
In Schneider v. Prentzler20 plaintiff relied solely upon physical facts.
Defendant relied upon the testimony of an eye-witness. Both types
of evidence qualified under the probative force test. The court stated
that it would not disqualify either type of evidence or give more weight
to one type than another in reviewing a jury's verdict. Circumstantial
evidence such as that based upon physical facts can be as effective and,
in some cases, more effective than direct eye-witness evidence in aiding
the trier of fact. Both types have exactly the same standing as far as ad-
missibility is concerned when both have met the probative force test.
In Chandler v. Gorda2 the case involved two sets of photographs of
a wooden bridge. The first set was taken shortly after the accident, the
19. § 49.680, RSMo 1959.
20. 391 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965).
21. 384 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. 1964).
[Vol. 31
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second, approximately eight months later. There were some changes in
the bridge shown by the last set of photographs. These were explained
and were not relied upon when the last set of photographs were offered in
evidence. Plaintiff's witnesses testified that in the later photographs the
bridge was hardly recognizable as the bridge in question. Defendant's
witness testified that, except for the changes as described, the last pho-
tographs were a fair representation of the bridge. The court held that
both sets of photographs had probative force. The effect of discrepancies
was for the jury. Here the court did not weigh evidence of the same type;
it determined only what portions of the offered evidence of the same type
met the probative force test.
E. Evidence May Be Admissable U%der the Probative Force Test Which
Wodd Not Be Admissible if a Formalized Rule Were Applied
Another danger in using a formalized rule of admissibility is that such
rules are too narrow and, if strictly applied, would exclude evidence having
probative force. In White v. Burkeybile22 plaintiff was allowed to read
from defendant's deposition narrative statements of how an automobile
collision occurred as admissions against interest. Much of this narrative
statement contained in the deposition and read into evidence did not
meet the classical definition of admissions against interest. Yet the portion
of defendant's deposition which was read did have some probative value
bearing upon plaintiff's version of the accident which was adverse to
defendant.
Although the court referred to this evidence as admissions against
interest, certainly there is some question as to whether it would conform
to the classical definition. No difficulty is encountered with this decision,
however, if the probative force test is applied. Then it clearly becomes
apparent that the previous deposition testimony of defendant was ad-
missible because it logically tended to prove plaintiff's version of the
accident. It is only common sense that plaintiff is not required to accept
a possible second version which defendant might well give from the witness
stand.
Once defendant made these statements in his deposition, plaintiff
could introduce them into evidence under the probative force test. This
should be true whether or not this evidence fell within the historical
22. 386 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. 1965).
19661
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formalized definition of a direct admission against interest. This illustrates
the flexibility of the probative force test. It allows the trier of fact to
consider all material which logically tends to prove or disprove the
main issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
The probative force test as now stated meets the demands of the
complexity of modem nociety. It supplies a rational basis for determining
admissibility of evidence. It eliminates misleading concepts. The present
trend is to recognize the probative force test and to give less emphasis
to the formalized historical rules.
The probative force test expresses in simple language a single and
exclusive measure for admissibility of evidence so that the trial judge and
lawyer have a practical guide. This does not mean that the point has
been reached where the formalized historical rules of evidence can be
ignored. So long as appellate courts continue to refer to such rules the
working lawyer must be well acquainted with them. The time will come
when the probative force test will be universally recognized as the main
guideline for admissibility of evidence. The law of evidence may yet
struggle out of the age of the abacus and join the rest of society's rules




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/9
